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FOREWORD
Rwanda's horrific civil war suggests that human disasters
requiring outside intervention will remain common in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The American people want a prompt and effective response
to human disasters when the United States becomes involved. The
Army is taking steps to enhance its demonstrated effectiveness at
such operations.
In this study, Steven Metz examines the policy and strategy
implications of violence-induced human disasters in Sub-Saharan
Africa with special emphasis on Rwanda. The author argues that
our senior military leaders, policymakers and strategists must
better understand the African security environment. He also warns
that to avoid overtaxing the military, U.S. objectives in African
disaster relief must be limited. This combination of limited
policy goals and operational efficiency will allow the U.S.
military to serve public demands at a minimal cost to its other
efforts.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study as part of the ongoing effort to improve American
capabilities in the complex array of operations other than war we
face in the post-Cold War security environment.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Human disasters born of armed conflict will continue to
plague Sub-Saharan Africa. When the American people demand
engagement, the U.S. military, especially the Army/Air Force
team, responds effectively and efficiently when local order has
collapsed or when local authorities resist relief efforts. The
better that Army planners and leaders understand the nature of
African conflict and the better they've prepared before such
conflicts occur, the greater the likelihood the Army can fulfill
the public's expectations at minimum cost to other efforts.
Why Rwanda Happened.
Human disasters in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by
widespread famine and disease, and often by large refugee
movements which overwhelm precarious systems of public health and
provision. They are almost always the direct or indirect result
of organized violence combined with economic stagnation and
disintegration, population pressure, ecological decay, and
regional conflict. Some are deliberately engineered by a regime
or local authorities to punish opponents, derail a separatist
movement, or undercut support for an insurgency. Others are
accidental, occurring when authority collapses.
Because of its combination of a history of primal violence,
intra-elite struggle, a weak economy, proximity to conflictridden neighbors, and a lack of outside interest, Rwanda was
especially vulnerable to human disaster. In many ways, the crisis
of 1994 was the inevitable result of 50 years of misrule,
repression, and violence.
Strategic Concepts.
When the United States joins a disaster relief operation in
Sub-Saharan Africa, our objectives must be limited. The U.S.
military's long-term objective should be only to establish or
reestablish civilian control that meets minimum standards of
human rights. The limits of our interests and the extent of our
global commitments simply will not allow sustained, expensive
engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. The key to increasing
efficiency and effectiveness in disaster intervention is
establishing and refining concepts and procedures. At the highest
level, the United States must make a number of key strategic
decisions before engaging in disaster intervention:
• When to intervene;
• Force mix and authority relationships; and,
• Exit strategy.
The specific contribution of the Army will depend, in part,
on whether a disaster is controlled or uncontrolled.

Conclusions.
The disaster in Rwanda supports several long-standing ideas
important to American policymakers and strategists:
• Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa is multidimensional;
• In African politics, personalities are vital;
• In areas of limited direct or tangible national interests,
the United States is unlikely to preempt a conflict or intervene
to stop a war;
• The United States needs to help develop better
multinational mechanisms to respond to African disaster before
crises happen;
• For the U.S. military, there is no substitute for
experience at disaster relief in Sub-Saharan Africa;
• The Army/Air Force team will bear the brunt of future
disaster relief efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa;
• While EUCOM will bear the major responsibility for
planning African disaster relief, the Army and Air Force staffs
should be more directly involved;
• Disaster relief strains Army Active Component combat
support and combat service support resources;
• Disaster relief should not be considered a primary Army
mission.
Army commanders might consider humanitarian relief in
Sub-Saharan Africa a distraction from their principal warfighting
mission, but they will probably be called on to perform these
kinds of operations in the future.

DISASTER AND INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
LEARNING FROM RWANDA
Introduction.
By now, Americans might appear numb to African violence and
the suffering of innocents that always follows, but the horror of
Rwanda was so extensive, so intense that it moved all but the
coldest observer. The timing of the crisis was particularly
troubling. Coming immediately on the heels of a war-induced
disaster in Somalia, Rwanda suggests a pattern or trend, hinting
ominously that similar crises might occur elsewhere in
Sub-Saharan Africa and again require a U.S. or multinational
response. As we attempt to ease the suffering of Rwandans, then,
we must also seek the wider strategic implications of their
experience. Perhaps from their pain we can draw the insight to
mitigate future disasters.
Several things are already clear. The American response to
this new breed of African disasters must break with the frequent
clumsiness of our past policy and be based on an understanding of
their peculiar historic, economic, social, and political context.
And, any assessment of the proper U.S. response must be placed
within the wider framework of our emerging post-Cold War national
security strategy. What we do in Africa will affect our image,
credibility, and moral standing around the world. It will also
help shape public attitudes toward the appropriate extent of
American involvement in the Third World. The glare of global
attention has made Rwanda an important if unintended component of
evolving U.S. policy in the Third World, a test case of sorts. If
the United States cannot find a way to respond effectively and
efficiently to African disasters, the hand of isolationists will
be strengthened. We can rebound from one Somalia, but probably
not from two. Much, then, is at stake–the symbolic importance of
Rwanda with its wider strategic implications may outweigh its
immediate significance. By looking closely at Rwanda, the United
States, particularly the U.S. military, can begin to develop the
means and the wisdom to make maximum use of our scarce resources
when the next African disaster explodes.
Why Rwanda Happened.
Human disasters are characterized by widespread famine,
disease, and, often, by large refugee movements which overwhelm
precarious systems of public health and food distribution. They
are almost always the direct or indirect result of organized
violence, usually primal conflict (based on ethnicity, tribalism,
religion, clan, caste, clique, or race) and the absence of
nonviolent means for ameliorating it. Combined with economic
stagnation and disintegration, population pressure, ecological
decay, and regional conflict, these factors form the foundation
of human disaster. It then takes only a spark to begin the
crisis.

From the perspective of U.S. policy and strategy, one of the
most important elements of a human disaster is the extent to
which it is controlled. Control can be thought of as a continuum.
At one end are human disasters deliberately engineered by a
regime or local authorities to punish opponents, derail a
separatist movement, or undercut support for an insurgency.
"Assaults on the food supply," as David Keen writes, "have become
a key military strategy in Africa's civil wars."1 This is not
unique to Africa: Stalin and Mao used famine as a tool of
internal security as did the U.S. Army in its campaigns against
the Navaho and Apache. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the most controlled
human disasters were probably Nigeria's war against Biafran
separatists in the 1960s, the "pacification" campaign against
Tigrean insurgents and Eritrean separatists by Mengistu's regime
in Ethiopia, and Sudan's counterinsurgency campaign in the
southern part of that country. At the other end of the continuum
are disasters that are either accidental, occurring when
authority collapses, or, like many wildfires in the American
West, deliberately started but uncontrollable. Rwanda is an
example of a disaster intentionally begun during a political
struggle which quickly ran out of control.
Although most African states were artificial creations of
European colonialism, Rwanda (like Burundi) was an established
kingdom for several centuries before being absorbed by German
East Africa in 1899.2 Because of its geographic isolation,
limited economic value and minimal strategic importance, the
Germans and, after 1916, the Belgians, used "indirect rule" in
Rwanda, leaving much administration to existing institutions and
individuals (see Figure 1). This meant that the traditional
domination of the Tutsi, which made up about 14 percent of the
Rwandan people, over the Hutus–85 percent of the population–
continued and was in some ways even reinforced, particularly when
Tutsis served as overseers of Hutu forced laborers on colonial
development projects. But even though traditional authority
persisted at the local level, the Belgians modernized the
national political, legal, and administrative systems. By
changing the educational system to include Hutus, the Belgians
also created a Hutu elite which would later lead that group's
efforts to transcend its historic subordination.
The Tutsi-Hutu conflict was not a typical African struggle.
Unlike, for instance, Angola where divisions were essentially
tribal or Somalia where clans were the most important political
units, the Tutsi-Hutu distinction was based on caste or class.3
Both belong to the Banyarwanda tribe and speak Kinyarwanda. In
the historic Kingdom of Rwanda, the royal family, nobles, army
commanders, most chiefs, and people who kept cattle were Tutsis;
some chiefs, soldiers, and people who grew crops were Hutus.4 In
fact, it was possible to move from Tutsi to Hutu or the reverse
as a family's economic situation declined or improved. Many
Rwandan intellectuals blame Belgian colonial policy for
transforming class distinctions into more intractable ethnic

ones.5 "We were taught in school that the Tutsis, Hutus, and Twa

were separate tribes," according to a refugee Tutsi, "but these
were tribes that were invented in Europe."6
In 1959, Hutu discontent exploded in outright rebellion. The
Belgians, who sympathized with the Hutus in part because they
considered the Tutsi elite pro-communist, restored order, but
increased the pace of democratization and decolonization.7 This,
of course, benefitted the more numerous Hutus at the expense of
the Tutsis. Rwanda attained independence in July 1962 firmly
under Hutu control. In the violence that followed, a number of
attacks were launched by guerrilla bands of the Tutsi-dominated
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). The response was repression and
outright massacre of Tutsis. This led to a large migration with
most refugees fleeing to neighboring Uganda and Zaire. By 1964,
between 40 and 70 percent of Rwanda's Tutsis were refugees, but
few abandoned hope of an eventual return to their homeland.8
With Tutsi opposition crushed, conflict erupted within the
Hutu elite as northerners resisted what they perceived as unfair
economic advantages given southerners by the government.9 This
intra-Hutu squabble exacerbated Hutu-Tutsi conflict as both
groups attempted to portray the other as Tutsi-influenced. In
1973, regional events ignited violence as the massacre of Hutus

by the Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi sparked further massacres
of Tutsis within Rwanda. During the ensuing disorder, Army Chief
of Staff Juvénal Habyarimana seized control. Habyarimana was a
charismatic young officer from a landowning family in northern
Rwanda. Defense minister at the age of 28, he was powerful and
bold.10 He immediately instigated reforms, most importantly a
degree of Hutu-Tutsi reconciliation. For the next fifteen years,
Rwanda under Habyarimana was relatively calm and competently
administered.
In 1989 a series of crises shattered this stability. A
combination of soil degradation, population pressure, crop
disease, and a precipitous decline in world prices for coffee–
Rwanda's major source of export earnings–led to economic
crisis.11 Famine spread and required substantial outside relief.
Coupled with seemingly endless government scandals, this
destroyed Rwanda's precarious political balance. On October 1,
1990, a military force of between 7,000 and 10,000 representing
the exiled, Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) entered
from Uganda.12 Although its senior leaders had not seen Rwanda
since they were babies and most of the rank and file had never
set foot there, they had long dreamed of a return to their
homeland. Many had accumulated military experience and political
support during the Ugandan conflict of the 1980s.13 In fact,
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni–himself a Tutsi from an earlier
migration–had seized power in 1986 with the help of about 2,000
guerrillas recruited from the Tutsi refugees in his country.14
Many held important leadership positions in his army.
While decades of resentment among the refugees formed the
foundation of rebel support, the immediate precipitants of the
invasion seemed to be stabilization of the situation inside
Uganda (thus freeing many RPF forces from duties there), and,
echoing the Bay of Pigs, the belief by RPF leaders that
discontent with the Habyarimana regime would generate public
support for the rebels once they entered Rwanda.15 With the help
of troops from Zaire, the Rwandan government was able to hold off
the invasion and the course of battle quickly turned against the
rebels. The RPF's charismatic leader, Fred Rwigyema, was killed
by a sniper on the first day of the campaign.16 After
near-defeat, the RPF shifted to guerrilla operations from bases
in the Virunga volcano chain. Under the direction of Major Paul
Kagame–often described as a military genius–they soon controlled
a strip of Rwandan territory along the Ugandan border. By late
1991, the military balance favored the rebels. Mediation efforts
by the other states of the region failed to end the conflict so,
to undercut support for the RPF, Habyarimana implemented further
political reforms and shuffled government ministries. Despite a
simultaneous crack down on opponents of the regime, the reforms
gave Hutu hardliners the impression that Habyarimana was "soft"
on the RPF. Among their responses was the formation of armed
militias–a step that amplified the later violence.17
At the end of 1992 the RPF had "fought to a position of near

invincibility."18 Further military successes by the rebels in
1993 (including the near-capture of Kigali, the capital) led to
negotiations between the government and RPF. The outcome was the
Arusha Accords which sought to end the war, demobilize both
sides, move the nation toward multiparty democracy, and
reintegrate the Tutsi refugees back into Rwandan life.19 The
Organization of African Unity (OAU) provided troops to monitor
the cease-fire, a step which the Clinton administration hoped
would be "a model for future OAU involvement in conflict
resolution."20 Despite the apparent promise, the accords were
bitterly opposed by Hutu hardliners, and all the parties
squabbled and maneuvered for political power in a transitional
government.21 Hatred was the stock-in-trade of these
machinations. Hutu hardliners felt that the RPF had received
concessions out of proportion to the 14 percent of the population
that it represented, further fanning rumors that the Habyarimana
government was Tutsi-influenced. Killing was encouraged by many
political leaders while many military deserters turned to
banditry, further strengthening the power of the armed
militias.22 This atmosphere of instability, violence,
recrimination, paranoia, and accusation was to prove incendiary.
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana and the
president of Burundi crashed. Although the exact cause has not
been determined, the aircraft was probably downed by a
shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile fired from Kigali.23 While
Hutu dissidents opposed to Habyarimana's reform and
reconciliation process seem to be the most likely culprits,
proving guilt quickly became almost irrelevant. The assassination
unleashed an immediate and apparently well-planned wave of
killing led by government forces and Hutu militias.24 Both
Tutsis and moderate Hutus were victims. In reality, this was only
an escalation of sporadic attacks on Tutsis begun after the 1990
invasion.25 However much the instigation of the violence was
deliberate and controlled, it quickly disintegrated into
genocidal anarchy as semiorganized militias and even bands of
neighbors killed with any available weapon.
A 2,500 member United Nations peacekeeping force was in
Rwanda when the violence erupted, but, even if it had been asked
to halt the killing, it was not authorized to use force. Without
hope of quick outside intervention, the RPF launched an offensive
to stop the massacres. Progress was slow, however, and by the
third week of the crisis, estimates of the victims were in the
hundreds of thousands. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
asked for an additional 5,500 peacekeepers but the Security
Council did not approve the new force until May 17. By then, aid
officials in Rwanda estimated that half a million had died.26
From around the world, promises of assistance were prompt;
delivery was not. Delayed by a dispute over repayment, 50 armored
personnel carriers from the United States were not sent until
mid-July. When they did arrive, they were unpainted and without
radios or machine guns, further delaying their use.27 In June, a
French military force established a safe zone in southwestern

Rwanda, but did not attempt to disarm the Hutu militias and
allowed government forces free movement in the area (see Figure
2).28 With a degree of confusion matching anything shown by the
United States in Somalia, the French initially stated that they
had drawn "a line in the sand" against advancing rebel forces and
then backed off, called their mission a success, and asked for a
U.N. force to relieve them.29 Ignoring the French, the RPF seized
Kigali and the last government strongholds, and established a
government of national unity with a moderate Hutu as president.30

For Rwanda, though, the end of the war did not stop the
suffering. In one of the most rapid and largest exoduses in human
history, more than a million Hutus, fearing Tutsi retribution for
the killings of April, May, and June, fled to Tanzania and Zaire.
Under appalling conditions in mass refugee camps, thousands died
from cholera, dysentery, and exhaustion. In late July, an
international relief effort including contingents of the U.S.
military began to come to grips with the immediate crisis, but
the long-term question of what to do with the refugees and how
(or whether) to encourage them to return home remained.31 While
the RPF's human rights record did not reach the horrific depths
of the Hutu militias', it planned to prosecute former government
officials and militia leaders on charges of genocide and
murder.32 Facing what they saw as a choice between death by
disease in the camps or death by Tutsi forces in Rwanda, most

refugees sat, waited, and sometimes died.
Strategic Considerations.
Rwanda will not be the last disaster that requires U.S.
military intervention. Many African states have the requisite
combination of primal conflict, an absence of nonviolent means
for ameliorating it, intense intra-elite political struggles, and
fragile systems for public health and provision. Many are
buffeted by economic stagnation and disintegration, political
corruption, population pressure, ecological decay, and regional
conflict. And, as the ability of the United States, the United
Nations, and nongovernmental relief organizations to respond to
human disasters improves and conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa
worsen, life in refugee camps will become more attractive to the
beleaguered people of Africa. It is one of the enduring ironies
of life that demands rise in proportion to competence. The United
States will soon find that the better we become at disaster
relief, the more we will be asked to do.
Simply ignoring calls for help is neither ethical nor
politically feasible. Although not all African disasters draw the
attention of the American people, when they do, the public
demands a quick and effective reaction. Only the U.S. military
has the full range of resources, training, and experience to
react rapidly to geographically isolated disasters when local
order and authority collapse. This is especially true of
specialized capabilities in logistics, transportation, and
intelligence. Many nations can provide infantry, but none can
match the wide and integrated capabilities of the United States.
Whether due to politics or resource limitations, African states
cannot confront large-scale crises without outside assistance.
This means that the U.S. military, acting in conjunction with
nongovernmental relief organizations, international organizations
like the United Nations, and other states, will probably become
involved in future African disasters. We must, therefore, push
our competence one step ahead of rising demands.
When the United States joins a disaster relief operation in
Sub-Saharan Africa, our objectives must be limited. "U.S.
strategic interests in Africa," according to Assistant Secretary
of Defense Charles W. Freeman, Jr., "are very modest."33 Our
concerns are primarily moral and symbolic. That does not
automatically make them less relevant, but does help define the
parameters of strategic feasibility. The limits of our interests
must shape our goals: when we do become involved, the immediate
objective should be to ameliorate catastrophe and meet basic
human needs. The U.S. military's long-term objective should be to
establish or reestablish civilian control that meets minimum
standards of human rights. This control may be by national
authorities or an international organization. Critics who argue
that such an approach leaves the root causes of disaster
unchanged and that the ultimate solution is establishing viable

democracies and stable economies are correct but misguided. The
limits of our interests and the extent of our global commitments
simply will not allow sustained, expensive engagement in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Memories of Somalia are still fresh. We will
often support long-term solutions, but seldom if ever assume sole
responsibility. Commenting on Rwanda, Secretary of Defense Perry
said, "We're there for emergency humanitarian aid, and as soon as
the operation is up and running, we want to get out and turn
things over to the relief agencies."34
Increasing efficiency and effectiveness requires sound
thinking. A number of key strategic decisions must be made before
engaging in disaster intervention:

When to Intervene. No decision is harder yet more central to
ultimate success than the timing of an intervention. Many
analysts take a "sooner is better" approach. To limit suffering,
they argue, we should preempt disasters. If that is impossible,
we should intervene as early as possible.35 President Clinton,
for instance, stated, "We should help the nations of Africa
identify and solve problems before they erupt."36 According to J.
Brian Atwood, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development, a mission he undertook to East Africa in 1994 to
organize international efforts to prevent a drought from
triggering famine probably saved more lives than his parallel
exertions in Rwanda.37 Similarly, Pentagon relief coordinator
Patricia L. Irvin said, "The most important thing for all of us
is to get better at creating an early-warning system, not just
for famines but man-made regional conflicts. We have to be able
to respond to them before they become so critical."38
However rational this "early is better" position, it
underestimates the severe constraints faced by U.S. strategists
and policymakers. We did not, after all, delay our involvement in
Rwanda because of amorality or stupidity. In the absence of a
clear, unmitigated disaster, it is often impossible to generate a
consensus among the American public and Congress for anything
more expensive than diplomatic action. However much they were
moved by the suffering in Rwanda, few Americans would have
supported sacrificing U.S. troops to stop it when many Rwandans
seemed to want it to continue. Furthermore, the notion of a
conflict being "ripe for resolution" is relevant when
contemplating intervention.39 As morally painful as it may be,
there are conflicts where hate must be exhausted before
resolution can begin. Just as the horrors of World War II made
the problems of Western Europe ripe for resolution, the bloodbath
in Rwanda may set the stage for an ultimate solution to that
nation's conflict. If the United States or a multinational force
had stopped the war before the RPF victory, a stockpile of hate
may have remained and festered, only to explode again in the near
future.
U.S. policy will generally be clear when a disaster falls at
either end of the controlled/uncontrolled continuum. At the

controlled end, we should pressure the regime engineering the
disaster either directly or by mobilizing international support.
If the regime changes its policy, the United States should
support multinational relief efforts. When a regime does not
respond, the United States might attempt to put together a
coalition for coercive intervention and relief and even
contribute military support forces and airpower, but will not, in
peripheral areas, take such actions alone. For clearly
uncontrolled disasters, relief must come first and political
efforts to hand over control to civilian authorities second. The
greatest problem, though, will come from disasters falling
between the controlled and uncontrolled ends of the continuum. As
always in strategy, the "gray areas" are the most complex. When
they occur, we must decide on a case-by-case basis whether
political pressure or relief should take priority. But American
policymakers and strategists must realize that the decision to
intervene is not made in a strategic vacuum. Intervention in
Somalia must be understood within the wider framework of attempts
to construct a "new world order"; the decision to intervene in
Rwanda may be related to our frustrations with Haiti. Similarly,
in a perfect world, transitory public opinion should not
determine policy. That may hold in areas where we have clear and
tangible national interests, but in peripheral regions such as
Sub-Saharan Africa, public opinion often will be a primary
determinant of policy. Astute policymakers and strategists will
accept this.

Force Mix and Authority Relationships. Because time is so
precious when responding to disasters, the proper chain of
authority will probably only be clarified as an operation
progresses. It would be both immoral and politically damaging to
argue over authority relationships while innocents died. Force
mixture requires somewhat greater attention. The more
underdeveloped the infrastructure and the more unstable the
region where a disaster occurs, the greater the role of the U.S.
military. This is especially true when there is a threat of
violence against the relief efforts. As a general rule of thumb,
civilian agencies should bear the absolute maximum degree of
responsibility possible. This will minimize the diversion of
military resources from other tasks and reflects the fact that
civilian agencies are better suited to the sorts of sustained
efforts required to bring a disaster-ridden area to some
semblance of normalcy. Within the U.S. military, combat forces in
particular should be at the lowest possible level. Combat forces
would play a major role during coercive intervention to forcibly
stop a controlled disaster and a fairly important role in
establishing security in volatile situations, but when there is
little threat of violence, only combat support and combat service
support forces would be involved.
Exit Strategy. All coherent military planning depends on a
clear notion of the desired end state or outcome. This certainly
holds for military involvement in human disasters. Most often,
success will be defined as bringing the disaster under control

and turning responsibility for relief operations over to
civilians, either multinational or national. Defining indicators
of unresolvability is more difficult. Once military forces are in
place, there is a tendency toward "mission creep." In all
disasters, a multitude of tasks, some directly connected with
relief operations and others subsidiary, need to be done. The
U.S. military's desire for effectiveness and efficiency lead it
to assume these tasks rather than leave them undone or in what is
perceived as less efficient hands. Establishing security is
especially tempting. Disasters are, by definition, disorderly.
Armed men abound, whether military forces, members of militias,
or simple gangsters. In fact, the three categories often overlap
in Sub-Saharan Africa. But when security degenerates, the
operation becomes peace enforcement rather than disaster relief.
At that point, the rules change. In peripheral areas like
Sub-Saharan Africa, then, it is vital for the U.S. military to
avoid mission creep and for American policymakers to be able to
admit unresolvability and resist any urge to assume full
responsibility for peace enforcement. We should not rigidly
eschew all involvement in peace enforcement in areas where our
national interests are minimal, but should allow the United
Nations or Organization of Africa Unity to lead and limit our
contribution to airpower, transportation, logistical support, and
intelligence. Finally, delineating specific procedures for the
hand-off of responsibility for relief activities to civilians is
a vital strategic decision that must be made early in an
operation.

The Army Contribution. If national policymakers decide to
attempt to preempt a potential disaster in Africa, the Army can
play a vital role. Intelligence experts and Foreign Area Officers
could help identify states susceptible to disaster and analyze
the causes of the problem. Psychological operations forces could
help ease tensions and increase the legitimacy of the government.
Engineers could support nation assistance and infrastructure
development which also increase government legitimacy and
economic development, thus eroding some of the conditions that
contribute to conflict and disaster. And, when a conflict with
the potential to spawn disaster seems imminent, the Army could,
if national leaders decide to pursue peace operations, provide
combat forces.
Once a disaster occurs, the specific role of the U.S. Army
will vary according to the extent the disaster is controlled (see
Figure 3). For a controlled disaster like southern Sudan, the
primary American effort must be mobilizing multinational
political and economic pressure to force the government to allow
relief. If the world community and the U.S. National Command
Authorities decide to forcibly end a controlled disaster, Army
combat forces, particularly light infantry and Special Forces,
would play an important role. These can be called the "change
policy" element of an Army force package. The "restore order"
element of an Army force package would include military police,
civil affairs, and psychological operations forces. These units

would help establish a suitable degree of civic order for

hand-off to civilian authorities. In a controlled disaster, their
job would only begin once local authorities consent to the relief
operation, whether willingly or unwillingly. This also holds for
what can be called the "provide relief" element of an Army force
package such as engineers, logistics, medical, and signal units.
Their primary task would be the actual distribution of relief
supplies. Finally, the "planning support" element of an Army
force package would play a vital role whether a disaster was
controlled or uncontrolled by providing intelligence, political,
social, and economic information, and planning expertise.
Conclusions.
Care must be taken in extrapolating lessons from Rwanda.
With the exception of neighboring Burundi, few other states in
Africa have precisely the same combination of caste conflict,
overpopulation, refugee flows, and regional intrigue. Still, the
disaster in Rwanda does offer evidence to support long-standing
ideas or conclusions, all of which are important to American
policymakers and strategists.

Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa is multidimensional. When
Americans attempt to understand African conflicts, they often
overemphasize the primal dimension. Tribes, castes, clans, and

cliques are important, but are not the sole determinant of
conflict and often not even the most important one. In African
conflicts primalism often begins as a secondary consideration and
only increases in importance when it is manipulated. Since this
also happened in the American South during the 1950s and 1960s
when some politicians fanned racial hatred to propel their
careers, Americans should understand it. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
the tendency to manipulate group differences for personal gain is
even more pronounced precisely because the stakes of politics are
so high. The winners of political competition not only have the
right to govern, but also control the economy and the
distribution of jobs, contracts and other resources. To lose a
political struggle is often to lose all. This makes political
competitors willing to stoop to any level, even the manipulation
of tribal distrust, to win the game.
Regional elements are equally important. African disasters
are shaped, perhaps even caused, by what goes on outside the
nation. Conflict in neighboring states, for instance, often
creates refugees. With political boundaries bearing little
resemblance to ethnic or tribal divisions, and violence endemic,
refugees have become a permanent fact of life for many African
states No conflict is strictly internal. Events in Rwanda were
shaped when bloodshed and repression in Burundi and Uganda led to
new refugee flows and altered the status of existing refugee
communities. Furthermore, conflicts in neighboring states
sometimes create antagonisms that generate external support for
insurgents or rebels.40 Two decades of war in Uganda provided
valuable military experience to the senior leadership of the RPF.
It also created a political debt which helped the RPF during its
struggle. While Museveni denied supporting the RPF's invasion of
Rwanda, it is unlikely that he was unaware of the training and
preparation that preceded it. The massacre of Hutus in Burundi as
recently as 1993 generated refugees who brought word of Tutsi
repression, thus flaming hostility and fear in Rwanda. And even
events in Somalia probably affected Rwanda by leading Hutu
hardliners to conclude that there would be no effective
international response to their massacre of Tutsis and moderate
Hutus. Primal schisms, then, shape conflicts in Sub-Saharan
Africa, but do not cause them. It is a combination of high-stakes
political machinations, economic stagnation, population pressure,
ecological decay, refugees, the absence of peaceful means for
conflict resolution, and primal violence that spawns human
disasters.

In African politics, personalities are vital. Americans,
accustomed to thinking in terms of organizations, institutions,
forces, parties, and movements, sometimes overlook the importance
of personalities in Sub-Saharan Africa. African politics,
according to Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "are most
often a personal or factional struggle to control the national
government or to influence it: a struggle that is restrained by
private and tacit agreements, prudential concerns, and personal
ties and dependencies rather than public rules and

institutions."41 Juvénal Habyarimana was powerful enough to build
and sustain a very fragile truce between the various conflicting
forces tearing at his nation, at least partially regulating the
hatred, distrust, manipulation, and paranoia that formed the
currency of Rwandan politics. Eventually, his ability to control
Hutu hardliners while attempting a Tutsi-Hutu rapprochement and
economic structural reform might have borne fruit, but his death
doomed Rwanda to violence. By the same token, the personalities
of the new regime will play a major role in determining whether
Rwanda's future holds reconciliation or simply spasmodic episodes
of disaster. American policymakers must therefore frame their
approach to Rwanda in terms of key personalities rather than
using oversimplified notions of tribal conflict.

In areas of limited direct or tangible national interests,
the United States is unlikely to intervene to stop a war. Rwanda
suggests that the United States will stop natural disaster but
not halt armed conflict. There is no public consensus in the
United States supporting military intervention in an ongoing war.
The American public can tolerate death by violence in peripheral
areas (or, at least, considers the costs of stopping it too
great). We have grown accustomed to human evil. But the public
cannot tolerate suffering from natural and, presumably,
preventable causes. Likewise, preemption is difficult in
peripheral areas like Sub-Saharan Africa. Successful preemption
of complex conflicts requires astute, sustained, and often
expensive engagement. As with deterrence, the preemptor can never
gain full satisfaction since it cannot be conclusively known
whether the preemption prevented an escalation of the conflict or
whether it would have subsided naturally. In areas of intense
national interest, the United States might pursue preemption in
spite of this uncertainty. In peripheral areas, we will not. We
must also be aware of the political complexities of preemption.
Since it will often entail augmenting stability by supporting a
regime, the United States will be seen as taking sides in the
conflict. This could lead to attempts by disgruntled parties to
target Americans, perhaps by terrorism within the United States.
It is a lamentable but clear fact that disaster relief seldom
creates hostility or antagonisms, while early involvement or
attempted preemption does. Given the pitfalls of preemption, we
are probably doomed to react to African disasters rather than
prevent them.
The United States needs to help develop better multinational
mechanisms to respond <T>to African disaster before crises
happen. Because we have limited tangible or direct national
interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, we must respond as efficiently
as possible. There are two ways to do that: first, preempt crises
or intervene early; and, second, organize (and perhaps lead) a
multinational and multi-agency response once a disaster does
occur. Both of these would be aided by a concerted American
effort to develop the ability of multinational organizations like
the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to
preempt and respond to disasters with limited U.S. assistance.42

Empowering other agencies could lead to a strategic level
division of labor freeing the United States for other tasks. The
more the OAU and UN can do, the less we will have to do.
Similarly, the United States should lead an initiative to
coordinate NATO responses to African disasters, including
pre-disaster training, crisis identification, and planning.

For the U.S. military, there is no substitute for experience
at disaster relief in Sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. military is
getting better, but much remains to be done. Stepped-up training
and exercising of noncombat joint task forces configured for
humanitarian relief could speed up the learning process and thus
should be pursued, even at some cost to combat training. None of
the U.S. military services should consider humanitarian relief a
primary mission. As Defense Secretary William J. Perry put it,
"We're an army, not a Salvation Army."43 Disaster relief will,
however, remain an important secondary function for the U.S.
military. The goal should be to provide the appropriate amount of
time and money to training and planning for these sorts of
operations–neither too much nor too little.
The Army/Air Force team will bear the brunt of future
disaster relief efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Marines have
done a superb job at disaster relief in Somalia, Bangladesh, and
elsewhere, but in future African disasters, the Army will
probably play the central role. The Marines are currently even
harder pressed to maintain warfighting proficiency and other
commitments than the Army. In addition, the Army has some
resources the Marines lack, particularly for sustained inland
operations. And as we pay greater heed to the perceptual
component of relief operations, Army psychological operations
forces will be essential. The "first team" for most African
disaster relief operations, then, will combine the Air Force's
strategic and intra-theater airlift capabilities with the Army's
ground resources. Disaster relief in Africa will be
multi-service, but not joint in the full sense of the term.
Planning and implementation of African disaster relief will, of
course, be the primary responsibility of EUCOM, but the fact that
such operations are multi-service rather than joint should lead
to an increased role for the Army and Air Force staffs in
prediction, preemption, and response.
Disaster relief strains Army Active Component combat support
and combat service support resources. For the Army, the
likelihood of future engagement in wide-scale disaster relief
requires a serious, zero-based rethinking of some key force
structure issues. Active Component combat support and combat
service support forces are very limited. In wartime, the Reserve
Component makes up this shortfall. In operations other than war
such as humanitarian relief, the Army is forced to choose between
overtaxing already strained Active Component forces or seeking
mobilization of reserve units which also has long-term costs in
terms of retainability and recruitment. While the Army Reserve
has most of the assets needed for human relief, there are serious

problems with relying on volunteerism rather than a unit call-up.
There are no easy and obvious solutions to this conundrum, but if
the Army is to increase its proficiency at humanitarian relief,
such force structure issues must be raised and examined. The only
ultimate solution may be moving at least some support
capabilities back to the Active Component.
*******
It would be easy for the Army to consider humanitarian
relief in Sub-Saharan Africa a distraction. There is no question
that such operations are costly to an organization already
hard-pressed to retain proficiency in its primary warfighting
missions. But three facts are clear. First, human disasters born
of armed conflict will continue to plague Sub-Saharan Africa.
Burundi, for instance, mirrors Rwanda and is currently teetering
on the edge of disaster.44 The Tutsi-dominated regime there
apparently rebuffed a UN attempt to preempt further conflict.45
Many other nations have all or most of the preconditions for
disaster. Most deadly of all would be human disasters in Africa's
giants, especially Nigeria or Zaire. Second, the American people
will sometimes demand U.S. engagement in African disasters. While
a number of factors including media activity and the extent to
which political leaders mobilize attention determine whether a
particular disaster captures public concern, when one does, the
U.S. response must be effective and efficient. And third, only
the U.S. military, particularly the Army/Air Force team, can
muster the full range of capabilities to respond quickly and
effectively to a human disaster where order has collapsed or
local authorities resist relief efforts. The goals of the Army
and the U.S. military in general should be, in order, to preempt,
predict, and respond efficiently and effectively when preemption
fails.
Because human disasters are often dramatic, highlypublicized events, the success with which the U.S. Army responds
will affect its broader public support. The better that Army
planners and leaders understand the nature of African conflict
and the better they've prepared before disasters occur, the
greater the likelihood the Army can fulfill the public's
expectations at minimum cost to other efforts.
ENDNOTES
1. David Keen, "In Africa, Planned Suffering," New York
Times, August 15, 1994, p. A15.
2. This section is based on Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Recent
History," Africa South of the Sahara 1992, London: Europa
Publications, 1992, pp. 813-816.
3. Catharine Watson, Exile from Rwanda: Background to an
Invasion, Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991, pp.
2-3. While the notion that the Tutsi-Hutu difference is based on

caste is becoming increasingly accepted, the traditional notion
was that the two represented different tribes, with the Tutsi a
pastoralist people of Nilotic origin who emigrated to Rwanda
relatively recently, and the Hutu an agricultural Bantu tribe
(for example, Alan C.G. Best and Harm J. de Blij, African Survey,
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977, p. 467.)
4. Watson, Exile from Rwanda, p. 3.
5. Charles Onyango-Obbo, "Rebellion Adds Momentum to Rwanda
Reform," Africa News, April 26-May 9, 1993, p, 3.
6. Quoted in Alex Shoumatoff, "Rwanda's Aristocratic
Guerrillas," New York Times Magazine, December 13, 1992, p. 44.
7. Ibid.; and Catharine Watson, "War and Waiting," Africa
Report, November-December 1992, p. 53.
8. Watson, Exile from Rwanda, p. 5.
9. "Why Rwanda?" West Africa, June 27-July 3, 1994, p. 1126.
10. Alan Rake, Who's Who in Africa: Leaders for the 1990s,
Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1992, pp. 263-264
11. Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Recent History," p. 815.
12. Watson cites the 7,000 figure and claims 4,000 had
deserted from Uganda's National Resistance Army (Exile from
Rwanda, p. 2). Charles Onyango-Obbo agrees on the number 7,000
("Rebellion Adds Momentum to Rwanda Reform," p. 3). The 10,000
figure is from Reyntjens, "Rwanda," p. 815.
13. Paul Kagame, head of the rebel army, was representing
Uganda as a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College at the time of the invasion. According to Watson, Kagame
was acting head of the Ugandan National Resistance Army's
military intelligence from November 1989 to June 1990 (Exile from
Rwanda, p. 13). He was at Fort Leavenworth, KS from June 1990
until his return to Rwanda when the invasion began.
14. William E. Schmidt, "Rwanda Puzzle: Is Uganda Taking
Sides?" New York Times, April 18, 1994, p. A6.
15. Watson, Exile from Rwanda, pp. 13-14.
16. Onyango-Obbo, "Rebellion Adds Momentum to Rwanda
Reform," p. 3. There were rumors that Rwigyema was murdered by
opponents within the RPF (Watson, Exile from Rwanda, p. 14;
Shoumatoff, "Rwanda's Aristocratic Guerrillas," p. 46).
17. Lindsey Hilsum, "Settling Scores," Africa Report,
May/June 1994, p. 14.

18. Watson, "War and Waiting," p. 51.
19. "Peace Accord in Rwanda May Be the Real Thing," Africa
Report, September/October 1993, p. 10.
20. "Rwanda Peace Agreement," Statement released by the
Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC, August 4, 1993, reprinted in U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, August 16, 1993, p. 584.
21. See Scott Stearns, "An Uneasy Peace," Africa Report,
January/ February 1994, pp. 32-35.
22. Watson, "War and Waiting," p. 55.
23. Hilsum, "Settling Scores," p. 14; Jane Perlez, "Under
the Bougainvillea, Hutu Litany on the Tutsi," New York Times,
August 15, 1994, p. A6.
24. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Policy: A Mistake?" New York Times,
July 23, 1994, p. 1.
25. Nicola Jefferson, "The War Within," Africa Report,
January/ February 1992, pp. 62-64.
26. Milton Leitenberg, "Anatomy of a Massacre," New York
Times, July 31, 1994, p. E15.
27. Paul Lewis, "France Calls Rwanda Mission a Success:
Asks for U.N. Force," New York Times, July 12, 1994, p. A8.
28. Raymond Bonner, "French Establish a Base in Rwanda to
Block Rebels," New York Times, July 5, 1994, p. A1.
29. Lewis, "France Calls Rwanda Mission a Success." For
illustrations of France's confusion on its role and mission in
Rwanda, see the reports in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Sub-Saharan Africa Daily Report, July 5, 1994, pp. 5-9. Raymond
Bonner suggests that the French wanted to protect the Hutu
government from the RPF but at a limited cost. ("As French Leave
Rwanda, Critics Reverse Position," New York Times, August 23,
1994, p. A6.)
30. Nelson Kasfir, "There's Hope For Rwanda," New York
Times, July 22, 1994, p. A27. For the membership and objectives
of the new government, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Sub-Saharan Africa Daily Report, July 20, 1994, p. 2.
31. Jane Perlez, "At Rwandan Camps, Life's a Bit Bearable,"
New York Times, August 3, 1994, p. A6.
32. Jerry Gray, "Rwanda Plans to Try Thousands For
Massacres, New Leader Says," New York Times, August 3, 1994, pp.

A1, A6.
33. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., "U.S. Military Interests in
Postapartheid South Africa," CSIS Africa Notes, No. 160, May
1994, p. 2.
34. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Worries About Cost of
Aid Missions," New York Times, August 5, 1994, p. A6.
35. This is the theme, for instance, of Jehl, "U.S. Policy:
A Mistake?" and Leitenberg, "Anatomy of a Massacre."
36. President Clinton, Remarks from a White House Conference
on Africa, Washington DC, June 27, 1994, reprinted in U.S.
Department of State Dispatch, July 4, 1994, p. 446.
37. J. Brian Atwood, "Suddenly, Chaos" (editorial),
Washington Post, July 31, 1994, p. C9.
38. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in
Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," New York Times, July 31, 1994,
p. 3.
39. For an elaboration of this, see I. William Zartman, Ripe
for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 220-251.
40. Earl Conteh-Morgan, "Conflict and Militarization in
Africa: Past Trends and New Scenarios," Conflict Quarterly, Vol.
13, No. 1, Winter 1993, p. 33.
41. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in
Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982, p. 1.
42. On the Organization of Africa Unity, see Carl A. Dada,
Need for the Organization of African Unity to Develop a
Peacekeeping Capability, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1990;
Clement Nwankwo, "The OAU and Human Rights," Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2, July 1993, pp. 50-55; and Oluyemi
Adenji, "Regionalism in Africa," Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No.
2, June 1993, pp. 211-220. On the Clinton administration's
efforts to strengthen the OAU, see Assistant Secretary of State
George E. Moose, statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington DC, June 8, 1994,
reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, June 20, 1994,
pp. 412-413. For an overview of the massive literature on the
strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations at preempting
conflict and responding to it, see Gene M. Lyons, "A New
Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace,"
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 173-199;
and, "Appendix B: Selected Bibliography," in Steven Metz, The
Future of the United Nations: Implications for Peace Operations,
Report of a Roundtable Sponsored by the Strategic Studies

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 31-37. See also the series
of articles covering the debate over nontraditional missions and
the use of force in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 18,
No. 1, Winter/Spring 1994. For an explanation of official policy,
see Madeleine K. Albright, "The Clinton Administration's Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," statement by the
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC,
May 5, 1994, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, May
16, 1994, pp. 315-318.
43. Quoted in Schmitt, "Pentagon Worries About Cost of Aid
Missions."
44. "The Great Fear in Burundi" (editorial), New York Times,
August 23, 1994, p. A20.
45. Jerry Gray, "Burundi Is Said to Rebuff U.N. Effort to
Restore Calm," New York Times, August 16, 1994, p. A8.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Brigadier General Richard A. Chilcoat
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel John W. Mountcastle
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Author
Dr. Steven Metz
Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
Secretary
Mrs. Shirley E. Martin
*****
Composition
Mr. Daniel B. Barnett
Cover Design
Mr. James E. Kistler

